Protecting individuals' privacy in online communications has become a challenge of paramount importance. To this end, anonymous communication (AC) protocols such as the widely used Tor network have been designed to provide anonymity to their participating users. While AC protocols have been the subject of several security and anonymity analyses in the last years, there still does not exist a framework for analyzing complex systems such as Tor and their different anonymity properties in a unified manner.
Contributions
In this work, we make three contributions to the field of anonymity analysis.
As a first contribution, we present the novel anonymity analysis framework AnoA.
In AnoA we define and analyze anonymity properties of AC protocols. Our anonymity definition is based on a novel generalization of differential privacy, a notion for privacy preserving computation that has been introduced by Dwork et al. [Dwo06, DMNS06] . The strength of differential privacy resides in a strong adversary that has maximal control over two adjacent settings that it has to distinguish. However, applying differential privacy to AC protocols seems impossible. While differential privacy does not allow for leakage of (potentially private) data, AC protocols inherently leak to the recipient the data that a sender sends to this recipient. We overcome this contradiction by generalizing the adjacency of settings between which an adversary has to distinguish. We introduce an explicit adjacency function α that characterizes whether two settings are considered adjacent or not. In contrast to previous work on anonymity properties, this generalization of differential privacy, which we name α-IND-CDP, is based on IND-CDP [MPRV09] and allows the formulation of anonymity properties in which the adversary can choose the messages-which results in a strong adversary-as long as the adjacent challenge inputs carry the same messages. Moreover, AnoA is compatible with simulation-based composability frameworks, such as UC [Can01] , IITM [KT13] , or RSIM [BPW07] . In particular, for all protocols that are securely abstracted by an ideal functionality [Wik04, CL05, DG09, KG10, BGKM12], our definitions allow an analysis of these protocols in a purely information theoretical manner.
As a second contribution, we formalize the well-established notions of sender anonymity, (sender) unlinkability, and relationship anonymity in our framework, by introducing appropriate adjacency functions. We discuss why our anonymity definitions accurately capture these notions, and show for sender anonymity and (sender) unlinkability that our definition is equivalent to the definitions from the literature. For relationship anonymity, we argue that previous formalizations captured recipient anonymity rather than relationship anonymity, and we discuss the accuracy of our formalization. Moreover, we show relations between our formalizations of sender anonymity, (sender) unlinkability, and relationship anonymity: sender anonymity implies both (sender) unlinkability and relationship anonymity, but is not implied by either of them.
As a third contribution, we apply our framework to the most successful AC protocol-Tor. Since the underlying cryptographic model does not capture system-level attacks, we model known system-level attacks, such as website fingerprinting and traffic correlation, as an overapproximation of the ideal functionality. In addition, we discuss a known countermeasure for Tor's high sensitivity to compromised nodes: the entry guards mechanism. We show that using entry guards dramatically reduces the adversary's success probability and why this is the case. We leverage previous results that securely abstract Tor as an ideal functionality (in the UC framework) [BGKM12] . Then, we illustrate that proving sender anonymity, sender unlinkability, and relationship anonymity against passive adversaries boils down to a combinatoric analysis, purely based on the number of corrupted nodes in the network.
Outline of the Paper. In Section 2 we introduce the notation used throughout the paper. Section 3 presents our anonymity analysis framework AnoA and introduces the formalizations of sender anonymity, unlinkability, and relationship anonymity notions in the framework. Section 4 compares our anonymity notions with those from the literature as well as with each other. In Section 5, we demonstrate compatibility of AnoA with a simulation-based composability framework (in particular, the UC framework), and we apply the corresponding preservation result to analyze the Tor network in Section 6. Finally, we conclude and discuss some further interesting directions in Section 8.
Notation
Before we present AnoA, we briefly introduce some of the notation used throughout the paper. We differentiate between two different kinds of assignments: a := b denotes a being assigned the value b, and a ← β denotes that a value is drawn from the distribution β and a is assigned the outcome. In a similar fashion i R ←I denotes that i is drawn uniformly at random from the set I. Probabilities are given over a probability space which is explicitly stated unless it is clear from context. For example Pr[b = 1 : b R ←{0, 1}] denotes the probability of the event b = 1 in the probability space where b is chosen uniformly at random from the set {0, 1}.
Our security notion is based on interacting Turing Machines (TM). We use an oracle-notation for describing the interaction between an adversary and a challenger: A B denotes the interaction of TM A with TM B where A has oracle access to B. Whenever A activates B again, B will continue its computation on the new input, using its previously stored state. A can then again activate B with another input value, and B will continue its computation with the new input, using its previously stored state. This interaction continues until A returns an output, which is considered the output of A B . In this paper we focus on computational security, i.e. all machines are computationally bounded. More formally, we consider probabilistic, polynomial time (PPT) TMs, which we denote with PPT whenever required.
The AnoA Framework
In this section, we present the AnoA framework and our formulations of sender anonymity, sender unlinkability, and relationship anonymity (Section 3.3). These formulations are based on a novel generalization of differential privacy that we describe in Section 3.2. Before we introduce this notion, we first describe the underlying protocol model. Using our protocol model, AC protocols are closely related to mechanisms that process databases, a fact that enables us to apply a more flexible form of differential privacy.
Protocol model
Anonymous communication (AC) protocols are distributed protocols that enable multiple users to anonymously communicate with multiple recipients. Formally, an AC protocol is an interactive Turing machine.
1 We associate a protocol with a user space U, a recipient space R and an auxiliary information space Aux. Users' actions are modeled as an input to the protocol and represented in the form of an ordered input table. Each row in the input table contains a user u ∈ U that performs some action, combined with a list of possible recipients r i ∈ R together with some auxiliary information aux. The meaning of aux depends on the nature of the AC protocol. Based on the AC protocol, auxiliary information can specify the content of a message that is sent to a recipient or may contain a symbolic description of user behavior. We can think of the rows in the input table as a list of successive input to the protocol.
Definition 1 (Input tables). An input table D of size t over a user space U, a recipient space R and an auxiliary information space Aux is an ordered table D = (d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d t ) of tuples d j = (u j , (r j i , aux j i ) i=1 ), where u j ∈ U, r j i ∈ R and aux j i ∈ Aux.
A typical adversary in an AC protocol can compromise a certain number of parties. We model such an adversary capability as static corruption: before the protocol execution starts A may decide which parties to compromise.
Our protocol model is generic enough to capture multi-party protocols in classical simulationbased composability frameworks, such as the UC [Can01] , the IITM [KT13] or the RSIM [BPW07] framework. In particular, our protocol model comprises ideal functionalities, trusted machines that are used in simulation-based composability frameworks to define security. It is straightforward to construct a wrapper for such an ideal functionality of an AC protocol that translates input tables to the expected input of the functionality. We present such a wrapper for Tor in Section 6.
Generalized Computational Differential Privacy
For privacy preserving computations the notion of differential privacy (DP) [Dwo06, DMNS06] is a standard for quantifying privacy. Informally, differential privacy of a mechanism guarantees that the mechanism does not leak any information about a single user-even to an adversary that has auxiliary information about the rest of the user base. It has also been generalized to protocols against computationally bounded adversaries, which has led to the notion of computational differential privacy (CDP) [MPRV09] . In computational differential privacy two input tables are compared that are adjacent in the sense that they only differ in one row, called the challenge row. The definition basically states that no PPT adversary should be able to determine which of the two input tables was used.
For anonymity properties of AC protocols, such a notion of adjacency is too strong. One of the main objectives of an AC protocol is communication: delivering the sender's message to the recipient. However, if these messages carry information about the sender, a curious recipient can determine the sender (see the following example).
Example (Privacy): Consider an adversary A against the "computational differential privacy" game with an AC protocol. Assume the adversary owns a recipient evilserver.com, that forwards all messages it receives to A. Initially, A sends input tables D 0 , D 1 to the IND-CDP challenger that are equal in all rows but one: In this distinguishing row of D 0 the party Alice sends the message "I am Alice!" to evilserver.com and in D 1 , the party Bob sends the message "I am Bob!" to evilserver.com. The tables are adjacent in the sense of computational differential privacy (they differ in exactly one row). However, no matter how well the identities of recipients are hidden by the protocol, the adversary can recognize them by their messages and thus will win the game with probability 1.
and forward all messages that are sent by P to the adversary A and send all messages by the adversary to P. Our generalization of CDP allows more fine-grained notions of adjacency; e.g., adjacency for sender anonymity means that the two tables only differ in one row, and in this row only the user that sends the messages is different. In general, we say that an adjacency function α is a randomized function that expects two input tables (D 0 , D 1 ) and either outputs two input tables (D 0 , D 1 ) or a distinguished error symbol ⊥. Allowing the adjacency function α to also modify the input tables is useful for shuffling rows, which we need for defining relationship anonymity (see Definition 6).
CDP, like the original notion of differential privacy, only considers trusted mechanisms. In contrast to those incorruptible, monolithic mechanisms we consider arbitrary protocols, and thus even further generalize and strengthen CDP: we grant the adversary the possibility of compromising parties in the mechanism in order to accurately model the adversary.
For analyzing a protocol P, we define a challenger Ch(P, α, b) that expects two input tables D 0 , D 1 from a PPT adversary A. The challenger Ch calls the adjacency function α on (D 0 , D 1 ). If α returns ⊥ the challenger halts. Otherwise, upon receiving two (possibly modified) tables D 0 , D 1 , Ch chooses D b , depending on its input bit b, and successively feeds one row after the other to the protocol P.
2 We assume that the protocol upon an input (u, (
Ch runs P with the input table D b and forwards all messages that are sent from P to A and all messages that are sent from A to P. At any point, the adversary may output his decision b * . Now we formally define (ε, δ)-α-IND-CDP. Figure 1 shows the full construction of Ch.
Definition 2 ((ε, δ)-α-IND-CDP). Let Ch be the challenger from Figure 1. The protocol P is (ε, δ)-α-IND-CDP for α, where ε ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, if for all PPT-adversaries A:
In the commonly used communication-efficient AC protocols such as Tor, ε = 0. However, we keep the parameter ε to maintain generality, since there are AC protocols in the literature with ε > 0 (e.g., pool mixes with dummy traffic [DP04] ).
A note on the adversary model. While our adversary initially constructs the two input tables in their entirety, our model does not allow the adversary to adaptively react to the information that it observes by changing the behaviors of users. This is in line with previous work, which also assumes that the user behavior is fixed before the protocol is executed [FJS07a, FJS12] .
The adjacency function α SA for sender anonymity.
As a next step towards defining our anonymity properties, we formally introduce the notion of challenge rows. Recall that challenge rows are the rows that differ in the two input tables.
Definition 3 (Challenge rows). Given two input tables A = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t ) and B = (b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b t ) of the same size, we refer to all rows a i = b i with i ∈ {1, . . . , t} as challenge rows. If the input tables are of different sizes, there are no challenge rows. We denote the challenge rows of D as CR(D).
Anonymity properties
In this section, we present our (ε, δ)-α-IND-CDP based anonymity definitions in which the adversary is allowed to choose the entire communication except for the challenge rows, for which he can specify two possibilities. First, we define sender anonymity, which states that a malicious recipient cannot decide, for two candidates, to whom he is talking even in the presence of virtually arbitrary auxiliary information. Second, we define user unlinkability, which states that a malicious recipient cannot decide whether it is communicating with one user or with two different users, in particular even if he chooses the two possible rows. Third, we define relationship anonymity, which states that an adversary (that potentially controls some protocol parties) cannot relate sender and recipient in a communication.
Our definitions are parametrized by ε and δ. We stress that all our definitions are necessarily quantitative. Due to the adversary's capability to compromise parts of the communication network and the protocol parties, achieving overwhelming anonymity guarantees (i.e., for a negligible δ) for non-trivial (and useful) AC protocols is infeasible.
Sender anonymity
Sender anonymity requires that the identity of the sender is hidden among the set of all possible users. In contrast to other notions from the literature, we require that the adversary is not able to decide which of two self-chosen users have been communicating. Our notion is stronger than the usual notion, and in Section 4 we exactly quantify the gap between our notion and the notion from the literature. Moreover, we show that the Tor network satisfies this strong notion, as long as the user in question did not choose a compromised path (see Section 6).
We formalize our notion of sender anonymity with the definition of an adjacency function α SA as depicted in Figure 2 . Basically, α SA merely checks whether in the challenge rows everything except for the user is the same. Notice that analogously recipient anonymity (α RA ) can be defined: the adjacency function then checks that the challenge rows only differ in one recipient.
Sender unlinkability
A protocol satisfies sender unlinkability, if for any two actions, the adversary cannot determine whether these actions are executed by the same user [PH10] . We require that the adversary does not know whether two challenge messages come from the same user or from different users. We formalize this intuition by letting the adversary send two input tables with two challenge rows, respectively. Each input table D x carries challenge rows in which a user u x sends a message to two recipients R u , R v . We use the shuffling abilities of the adjacency function α UL as defined in Figure 3 , which makes sure that D 0 will contain the same user in both challenge rows, whereas D 1 will contain both users. As before, we say a protocol P fulfills sender unlinkability, if no adversary A can sufficiently distinguish Ch(P, α UL , 0) and Ch(P, α UL , 1). This leads to the following concise definition.
Definition 5 (Sender unlinkability). A protocol P provides (ε, δ)-sender unlinkability if it is (ε, δ)-α-IND-CDP for α UL as defined in Figure 3 .
Example (Sender unlinkability): The adversary A decides that he wants to use users Alice and Bob in the unlinkability game. He sends input tables D 0 , D 1 such that in the challenge rows of D 0 Alice sends two messages to two recipients and in D 1 , Bob sends the same two messages to the same recipients. Although initially "the same user sends the messages" would be true for both input tables, the adjacency function α UL changes the challenge rows in the two input tables 
Relationship anonymity
P satisfies relationship anonymity, if for any action, the adversary cannot determine sender and recipient of this action at the same time [PH10] . We model this property by letting the adjacency α Rel check whether it received an input of two input tables with a single challenge row. We let the adjacency function α Rel shuffle the recipients and sender such that we obtain the four possible combinations of user and recipient. If the initial challenge rows are (u 0 , R 0 ) and (u 1 , R 1 ), α Rel will make sure that in D 0 one of those initial rows is used, where in D 1 one of the rows (u 0 , R 1 ) or (u 1 , R 0 ) is used. We say that P fulfills relationship anonymity, if no adversary can sufficiently distinguish Ch(P, α Rel , 0) and Ch(P, α Rel , 1). A sends input tables D 0 , D 1 such that in the challenge row of D 0 Alice sends m 1 to Charly and in D 1 , Bob sends m 2 to Eve. Although initially 'scenario 0" would be true for both input tables, the adjacency function α Rel changes the challenge rows in the two input tables D 0 , D 1 such that in D 0 one of the two possible inputs for scenario "0" will be present (either Alice talks to Charly or Bob talks to Eve) and in D 1 one of the two possible inputs for scenario "1" will be present (either Bob talks to Charly or Alice talks to Eve). 
Studying our anonymity definitions
In this section, we show that our anonymity definitions indeed capture the anonymity notions from the literature. We compare our notions to definitions that are directly derived from informal descriptions in the seminal work by Pfitzmann and Hansen [PH10] . Lastly, we investigate the relation between our own anonymity definitions.
Sender anonymity
The notion of sender anonymity is introduced in [PH10] as follows:
Anonymity of a subject from an attacker's perspective means that the attacker cannot sufficiently identify the subject within a set of subjects, the anonymity set.
From this description, we formalize their notion of sender anonymity. For any message m and adversary A, any user in the user space is equally likely to be the sender of m.
Definition 7 (δ-sender anonymity). A protocol P with user space U of size N has δ-sender anonymity if for all PPT-adversaries A
where the challenger SACh as defined as in Figure 5 .
Note that SACh slightly differs from the challenger Ch(P, α, b) in Figure 1 : It does not require two, but just one input table in which a single row misses its sender. We call this row the challenge row.
This definition is quite different from our interpretation with adjacency functions. While α SA requires A to simply distinguish between two possible outcomes, Definition 7 requires A to correctly guess the right user. Naturally, α SA is stronger than the definition above. Indeed, we can quantify the gap between the definitions: Lemma 8 states that an AC protocol satisfies (0, δ)-α SA implies that this AC also has δ-sender anonymity. The proofs for these lemmas can be found in Appendix H.2.In this section, we only present the proof outlines.
Lemma 8 (sender anonymity). For all protocols P over a (finite) user space U of size N it holds that if P has (0, δ)-α-IND-CDP for α SA , P also has δ-sender anonymity as in Definition 7.
Proof outline. We show the contraposition of the lemma: an adversary A that breaks sender anonymity, can be used to break α-IND-CDP for α SA . We construct an attacker B against α-IND-CDP for α SA by choosing the senders of the challenge rows at random, running A on the resulting game, and outputting the same as A. For A the resulting view is the same as in the sender anonymity game; hence, B has the same success probability in the α-IND-CDP game as A in the sender anonymity game. In the converse direction, we lose a factor of 1 N in the reduction, where N is the size of the user space. If an AC protocol P provides δ-sender anonymity, we only get (0, δ · N )-α SA for P.
Lemma 9. For all protocols P over a (finite) user space U of size N it holds that if P has δ-sender anonymity as in Definition 7, P also has (0, δ · N )-α-IND-CDP for α SA .
Proof outline. We show the contraposition of the lemma: an adversary A that breaks α-IND-CDP for α SA , can be used to break sender anonymity. We construct an attacker B against sender anonymity by running A on the sender anonymity game and outputting the same as A. If the wishes of A for the challenge senders coincide with the sender that the challenger chose at random, the resulting view is the same as in the α-IND-CDP game for α SA ; hence, B has a success probability of δ/N in the sender anonymity game if A has a success probability of δ in the α-IND-CDP game for α SA .
Unlinkability
The notion of unlinkability is defined in [PH10] as follows:
Unlinkability of two or more items of interest (IOIs, e.g., subjects, messages, actions, ...) from an attacker's perspective means that within the system (comprising these and possibly other items), the attacker cannot sufficiently distinguish whether these IOIs are related or not.
Again, we formalize this in our model. We leave the choice of potential other items in the system completely under adversary control. Also, the adversary controls the "items of interest" (IOI) by choosing when and for which recipient/messages he wants to try to link the IOIs. Formally, we define a game between a challenger ULCh and an adversary A as follows: First, A chooses a input table D, but leaves the place for the users in two rows blank. The challenger then either places one (random) user in both rows or two different (random) users in each and then runs the protocol and forwards all output to A. The adversary wins the game if he is able to distinguish whether the same user was placed in the rows (i.e. the IOIs are linked) or not.
Definition 10 (δ-sender unlinkability). A protocol P with user space U has δ-sender unlinkability if for all PPT-adversaries A P r b = 0 : b←A
where the challenger ULCh is as defined in Figure 6 .
We show that our notion of sender unlinkability using the adjacency function α UL is much stronger than the δ-sender unlinkability Definition 10: (0, δ)-α UL for an AC protocol directly implies δ-sender unlinkability; we do not lose any anonymity.
Lemma 11 (sender unlinkability). For all protocols P over a user space U it holds that if P has (0, δ)-α-IND-CDP for α UL , P also has δ-sender unlinkability as in Definition 10.
Proof outline. We show the contraposition of the lemma: an adversary A that breaks sender unlinkability, can be used to break α-IND-CDP for α UL . We construct an attacker B against α-IND-CDP for α UL by choosing the senders of the challenge rows at random, running A on the resulting game, and outputting the same as A. For A the resulting view is the same as in the sender unlinkability game; hence, B has the same success probability in the α-IND-CDP game for α UL as A in the sender unlinkability game.
For the converse direction, however, we lose a factor of roughly N 2 for our δ. Similar to above, proving that a protocol provides δ-sender unlinkability only implies that the protocol is
Lemma 12 (sender unlinkability). For all protocols P over a user space U of size N it holds that if P has δ-sender unlinkability as in Definition 10, P also has (0,
Proof outline. We show the contraposition of the lemma: an adversary A that breaks α-IND-CDP for α UL , can be used to break sender unlinkability. We construct an attacker B against sender unlinkability by running A on the sender unlinkability game and outputting the same as A. If the senders from the challenge from of A coincide with the senders that the challenger chose at random, the resulting view is the same as in the α-IND-CDP game for α UL ; hence, B has a success probability of δ/N (N − 1) in the sender unlinkability game if A has a success probability of δ in the α-IND-CDP game for α UL .
Again, proofs can be found in Appendix H.2.
Relationship anonymity
While for sender anonymity and sender unlinkability our notions coincide with the definitions used in the literature, we find that for relationship anonymity, many of the interpretations from the literature are not accurate. In their Mixnet analysis, Shmatikov and Wang [SW06] define relationship anonymity as 'hiding the fact that party A is communicating with party B'. Feigenbaum et al. [FJS07b] also take the same position in their analysis of the Tor network. However, in the presence of such a powerful adversary, as considered in this work, these previous
The relations between our anonymity definitions notions collapse to recipient anonymity since they assume knowledge of the potential senders of some message. We consider the notion of relationship anonymity as defined in [PH10] : the anonymity set for a message m comprises the tuples of possible senders and recipients; the adversary wins by determining which tuple belongs to m. However, adopting this notion directly is not possible: an adversary that gains partial information (e.g. if he breaks sender anonymity), also breaks the relationship anonymity game, all sender-recipient pairs are no longer equally likely. Therefore we think that approach via the adjacency function gives a better definition of relationship anonymity because the adversary needs to uncover both sender and recipient in order to break anonymity.
Relations between anonymity notions
Having justified the accuracy of our anonymity notions, we proceed by presenting the relations between our notions of anonymity. AnoA allows us to formally argue about these relations. Figure 7 illustrates the implications we get based on our definitions using adjacency functions. In this section, we discuss these relations. The proofs can be found in Appendix H.2.
Lemma 13 (Sender anonymity implies relationship anonymity.). If a protocol P has (0, δ)-α-IND-CDP for α SA , is also has (0, δ)-α-IND-CDP for α Rel .
Proof outline. Relationship anonymity requires an adversary to acquire information about both sender and recipient. If a protocol has sender anonymity, this is not possible. Hence, sender anonymity implies relationship anonymity.
Similarly, recipient anonymity implies relationship anonymity.
Lemma 14 (Sender anonymity implies sender unlinkability). If a protocol
Proof outline. Our strong adversary can determine the behavior of all users; in other words, the adversary can choose the scenario in which it wants to deanonymize the parties in question. Thus, the adversary can choose the payload messages that are not in the challenge row such that these payload messages leak the identity of their sender. Hence, if an adversary can link the message in the challenge row to another message, it can determine the sender. Thus, sender anonymity implies sender unlinkability.
A protocol could leak the sender of a single message. Such a message does not necessarily help an adversary in figuring out whether another message has been sent by the same sender, but breaks sender anonymity.
Lemma 15 (Sender unlinkability does not imply sender anonymity). If a protocol P has (0, δ)-α-IND-CDP for α UL , P does not necessarily have (0, δ )-α-IND-CDP for α SA for any δ < 1.
Proof outline. We consider a protocol Π that satisfies sender anonymity. We, moreover, consider the modified protocol Π that leaks the sender of a single message. Since by Lemma 14 Π satisfies unlinkability, we conclude that the modified protocol Π satisfies sender unlinkability: a single message does not help the adversary in breaking sender unlinkability. However, Π leaks in one message the identity of the sender in plain, hence does not satisfy sender anonymity.
Relationship anonymity does not imply sender anonymity in general: for example, a protocol may reveal information about senders of the messages, but not about recipients or message contents.
Lemma 16 (Relationship anonymity does not imply sender anonymity). If a protocol P has (0, δ)-α-IND-CDP for α Rel , P does not necessarily have (0, δ )-α-IND-CDP for α SA for any δ < 1.
Proof outline. We consider a protocol Π that satisfies sender anonymity. We, moreover, consider the modified protocol Π that for each message leaks the sender. Since by Lemma 13 Π satisfies unlinkability, we conclude that the modified protocol Π satisfies relationship anonymity: the sender alone does not help the adversary in breaking relationship anonymity. However, Π leaks the identity of the sender in plain, hence does not satisfy sender anonymity.
This concludes the formal definition of our framework.
Leveraging UC realizability
Our adversary model in AnoA is strong enough to capture well-known simulation-based composability frameworks (e.g., UC [Can01] , IITM [KT13] or RSIM [BPW07] ). In Section 6 we apply AnoA to a model in the simulation-based universal composability (UC) framework.
In this section, we briefly introduce the UC framework and then prove that α-IND-CDP is preserved under realization. Moreover, we discuss how this preservation allows for an elegant crypto-free anonymity proof for cryptographic AC protocols.
The UC framework
The UC framework allows for a modular analysis of security protocols. In the framework, the security of a protocol is defined by comparing it with a setting in which all parties have a direct and private connection to a trusted machine that provides the desired functionality. As an example consider an authenticated channel between two parties Alice and Bob. In the real world Alice calls a protocol that signs the message m to be communicated. She then sends the signed message over the network and Bob verifies the signature. In the setting with a trusted machine T , however, we do not need any cryptographic primitives: Alice sends the message m directly to T 3 . T in turn sends m to Bob, who trusts T and can be sure that the message is authentic. The trusted machine T is called the ideal functionality.
Security in the UC framework is defined as follows: A protocol is secure if an execution of this protocol is indistinguishable from an execution of the corresponding ideal functionality.
3 Recall that T and Alice are directly connected, as well as T and Bob.
More formally, the notion of indistinguishability is captured in UC in terms of realization: A protocol π UC-realizes an ideal functionality F if for all PPT adversaries A there is a PPT simulator S such that no PPT machine can distinguish an interaction with π and A from an interaction with F and S. The distinguisher is connected to the protocol and the adversary (or the simulator). A full definition can be found in Appendix H.3.
Preservation of α-IND-CDP
We prove that α-IND-CDP is preserved by UC realization. This result is motivated by the ideas presented in the result of integrity property conservation by simulation-based indistinguishability shown by Backes and Jacobi [BJ03, Thm. 1].
As a consequence of this lemma, it suffices to apply AnoA to ideal functionalities: transferring the results to the real protocol weakens the anonymity guarantees only by a negligible amount.
Lemma 17 (Preservation lemma). Let P be ( , δ)-α-IND-CDP and Π be a protocol. If Π UC-realizes P then Π is ( , ∆)-α-IND-CDP with ∆ = δ + δ for some negligible value δ .
Proof outline. The proof of the preservation lemma is straightforward: If the success probability of an adversary in the real world differs in more than a negligible value from the ideal world, we can use this adversary to distinguish the real from the ideal game.
The full proof can be found in Appendix H.3. This preservation lemma, in combination with an ideal functionality for an AC protocol, is useful for analyzing the AC protocol with respect to our strong anonymity definitions. In the next section, we exemplify approach by using an ideal functionality for Tor [BGKM12] and showing that the anonymity analysis of Tor boils down to a purely combinatorical analysis.
Analyzing Tor Anonymity
The onion routing (OR) [RSG98] network Tor [Tor03] is the most successful anonymity technology to date: hundreds of thousands individuals all over the world use it today to protect their privacy over the Internet. Naturally, Tor is our first choice for applying our AnoA framework.
We start our discussion by briefly describing the Tor protocol [DMS04] and its UC definition [BGKM12] . We then formally prove (ε, δ)-α-IND-CDP for Tor's UC definition and quantify anonymity provided by the Tor network in terms of the anonymity properties defined in Section 3. Finally, we consider a selection of system-level attacks (e.g., traffic analysis) and adaptations (e.g., entry guards) for Tor, and analyze their effects on Tor's anonymity guarantees.
Tor-The OR Network
An OR network such as Tor [DMS04] consists of a set of OR nodes (or proxies) that relay traffic, a large set of users and a directory service that maintains and provides cryptographic and routing information about the OR nodes. Users utilize the Tor network by selecting a sequence of OR nodes and creating a path, called a circuit, over this set. This circuit is then used to forward the users' traffic and obscure the users' relationship with their destinations. It is important that an OR node cannot determine the circuit nodes other than its immediate predecessor and successor. In the OR protocol, this is achieved by wrapping every message in multiple layers of symmetric-key encryption. Symmetric keys are agreed upon between each OR node in the circuit and the user during the circuit construction phase.
Figure 8: Wrapper module Env u for onion proxy P u Tor was designed to guarantee anonymity against partially global attackers, i.e., attackers that do not only control some OR nodes but also a portion of the network. However, an accurate anonymity quantification is not possible without formally modeling the OR protocol and its adversary. In an earlier work, Backes et al. [BGKM12] presented a formal UC definition (an ideal functionality F or ) for the OR network, and proposed a practical cryptographic instantiation which is currently employed in the Tor network. We employ this ideal functionality F or for instantiating the AnoA framework.
Anonymity Analysis
We start our Tor analysis with a brief overview of the F or functionality and refer the readers to [BGKM12] for more details. An excerpt of relevant details can also be found in Appendix I. F or presents the OR definition in the message-based state transitions form, and defines sub-machines for all OR nodes in the ideal functionality. These sub-machines share a memory space in the functionality for communicating with each other. F or assumes an adversary who might possibly control all communication links and destination servers, but cannot view or modify messages between uncompromised parties due to the presence of secure and authenticated channels between the parties. In F or these secure channels are realized by having each party store their messages in the shared memory, and create and send corresponding handles P, P next , h through the network. Here, P and P next are the sender and the recipient of a message respectively and h is a handle, or pointer, for the message in the shared memory. Only messages that are visible to compromised parties are forwarded to A.
We consider a partially global, passive adversary for our analysis using AnoA, i.e., A decides on a subset of nodes before the execution, which are then compromised. The adversary A then only reads intercepted messages, but does not react to them.
Tor sets a time limit (of ten minutes) for each established circuit. However, the UC framework does not provide a notion of time. F or models such a time limit by only allowing a circuit C to transport at most a constant number (say ttl C ) of messages.
Upon message m from F net or F or send m to the challenger reflect the message m back to sender Figure 9 : Dummy-adversary in F or
In the context of onion routing, we interpret an input table
) defines a session transmitted through the OR-network, where aux j is the message sent from the user to recipient r j . An input table thus defines a sequence of sessions sent through the OR-network.
We assume that for each row in an input table, a new circuit in the OR-network is drawn, as each row defines a newly started OR session. Furthermore, the number of messages per row (or session) is bounded by ttl C .
In order to make F or compatible with our α-IND-CDP definition, we require an additional wrapper functionality, which processes the input rows forwarded from the challenger Ch. This functionality is defined in Figure 8 . Env u receives a row, which had u as its user, as its input. It then initiates the circuit construction for the new session and sends all messages in the row through this circuit.
Messages intercepted by compromised nodes are sent to a network adversary F net described in Fig. 9 . F net forwards all intercepted messages to the challenger, who in turn forwards them to A.
We show that the Tor analysis can be based on a distinguishing event D, which has already been identified in the first onion routing anonymity analysis by Syverson et al. [STRL00, Fig. 1 ]. The key observation is that the adversary can only learn about the sender or recipient of some message if he manages to compromise the entry-or exit-node of the circuit used to transmit this message. We define the distinguishing event D α for each of the anonymity notions defined in section 3.
Sender Anonymity (α SA ). Let D αSA be the event that the entry-node of the challenge row is compromised by A. This allows A to determine the sender of the challenge row and therefore break sender anonymity.
Sender Unlinkability (α UL ). Let D αUL be the event that A successfully compromises the entry nodes for both challenge rows in the unlinkability game. This allows A to determine whether the sessions defined by the challenge rows are linked or not, and hence break the unlinkability game.
Relationship Anonymity (α Rel ). Let D α Rel be the event that A successfully compromises entry-and exit-node of the challenge row. This allows him to link both sender and recipient of the sessions associated with the challenge row.
We first prove Lemma 18. It captures anonymity provided by F or in case D does not happen. We then use Lemma 18 to prove (ε, δ)-α-IND-CDP for F or in general.
We introduce random strings r A and r Ch as additional input to the adversary and the challenger respectively. This allows us to handle them as deterministic machines and simplifies the proof for Lemma 18. Accordingly, all subsequent probabilities are taken over those random strings. In the following, we present a proof outline here.
The full proof is available in Appendix J.1.
p(η) . Given two input tables D 1 , D 0 which are adjacent for α ∈ {α SA , α UL , α Rel }, it holds that
Proof outline. We fix the random string r Ch . This in turn fixes the circuits drawn by F or for each row. As circuits are drawn independently from the transmitted messages, F or draws the same set of circuits to transmit either input table.
We assume the event ¬D α . For α SA and α UL , the messages intercepted by A do not carry critical information and look the same, regardless of which input table was chosen by the challenger. If we now also fix r A , A returns the same value after processing the set of intercepted messages, for either input table.
For α Rel , A might learn partial information. But there are always at least two of the four input tables, each of which could have only been chosen by one of the challengers, for which the intercepted messages are consistent. Again, if we fix r A , A will return the same value, regardless of which challenger he is interacting with. Hence we get
and from this
as required.
With this result we obtain (ε, δ)-α-IND-CDP for F or by simple manipulation of equations.
Here δ is exactly the probability for the event D α that allows A to distinguish between both input tables. Interestingly, we get the parameter value ε = 0. This implies that as long as D α does not happen, F or provides perfect anonymity for its users.
Anonymity Quantification
We now evaluate the guarantees provided by Theorem 19 and consider further results we can derive from it for the special case of sender anonymity.
Distinguishing events
We measure the probability of the distinguishing event D using combinatorial observations. For an OR network of n OR nodes such that k of those are compromised, probabilities associated with the various anonymity notions are as follows:
Sender Anonymity (α SA ). The probability that D αSA happens and sender anonymity is broken, is
Sender Unlinkability (α UL ). The probability that D αUL happens and sender unlinkability is broken, is
Relationship Anonymity (α Rel ). The probability that D α Rel happens and relationship anonymity is broken, is Figure 10 illustrates these results. The graph shows the probability of the distinguishing events depending on the fraction k n of corrupted OR nodes. We assume a system with 3000 OR nodes, which is consistent with current numbers in the real world Tor network [Tor] . We observe that the success probability of event D αSA always remains above the success probabilities of events D αUL and D α Rel . Therefore, sender anonymity is indeed a stronger notion than both relationship anonymity and sender unlinkability, and correspondingly more difficult to achieve. Moreover, for the usually assumed 20% corruption, the adversary's success probabilities are small for all three anonymity properties.
Note that the above analysis and the underlying model assume all OR nodes to be identical, and can perform all roles. Respecting OR node operators' legal boundaries, the real-world Tor network allows OR nodes to function in specific roles. To some extent, this simplifies A's task of identifying entry-or exit-nodes for circuits.
Multiple Challenge Rows
Considering more than one challenge row will be necessary if we want to know how the anonymity of a single user changes if he uses Tor for more than one session or we want to consider the anonymity of a group of people which act as one entity.
If we want to extend our (ε, δ)-α-IND-CDP result w.r.t α SA for Tor to more than one challenge row, we can use the direct amplification approach also known from differential privacy analysis [DKM
We can do better by realizing that the only thing that changes compared to our original analysis is the distinguishing event: Whereas before the adversary A could compromise only a single entry node, he now has up to d entry nodes at his disposal. Using this approach we get a strictly better bound for our δ compared to using the straightforward amplification approach, i.e., P r[D * αSA ] < dP r[D αSA ]. The extent to which this is better varies and depends on the parameters n, k and m and is further elaborated on in Appendix J.2.
System-Level Attacks and Adaptations
Next, we consider attacks that are not directly covered by our model and explore how the strong adversary we employ helps to deal with them. We then analyze the entry guard mechanism, a feature of the Tor protocol, and its influence on sender anonymity.
Traffic Analysis Attacks
Many of the known attacks on Tor nowadays depend on so called side-channel information, i.e. throughput and timing information an adversary might gather while watching traffic routed through the Tor network. Since the UC framework does not allow time-sensitive attacks, traffic analysis is outside of the scope of this work. However, due to the strong adversary we deploy, we can still cover all known attacks by making suitable assumptions. In the following we look at two well known traffic analysis attacks and how we can cover them in our model. Traffic Correlation. These forms of traffic analysis attacks observe traffic going out from the sender and into the receiver and try to correlate them based on different features like volume, direction or inter-packet delay [OB09, WRW02] . We cover these attacks by assuming that the adversary knows which row of the input tables was being transmitted for each of the messages he intercepts. This enables him to find out who communicates with whom by simply compromising entry-and exit-node of the same circuit. This is made explicit in our extension of F or for traffic analysis which can be found in Appendix I.3. Website Fingerprinting. Fingerprinting attacks try to classify user traffic based on a catalog of fingerprints derived for a large set of web pages beforehand and matching the observed traffic to those fingerprints [PNZE11, CZJJ12, DCRS12] . This kind of attack can be modeled by assuming that it is enough for the adversary to compromise the entry node (i.e. we define a new distinguishing event D W F that captures this) to find the recipient, as he will then be able to launch the fingerprinting attack. The δ in Theorem 19 then changes to
where S is the event that the website fingerprinting attack successfully classifies the traffic.
Entry Guards
Using the formulation for more than one challenge row, we can also motivate entry guards [WALS03, ØS06] , which are used in the current implementation of Tor. Entry guards are a small subset of the whole set of onion routers that are chosen by a user before the initiation of a Tor communication. They are then used as entry nodes for any subsequent communication. The advantage of this concept becomes apparent if we look at the following scenario:
4 Consider a single user u who communicates using Tor over a long period of time, initiating a total of d new sessions. Without entry guards, the probability that A de-anonymizes u is bounded by
which converges to 1 the bigger d gets. If we do use a set of m entry guards on the other hand, the probability for de-anonymizing u will stay constant at
In order to prevent loss of performance, entry guards are also replaced at regular intervals. Let l be the maximum number of sessions possible per entry-guard-interval. The probability for de-anonymization can then be bounded by
which is smaller than the original value, but still converges to 1 at some point. Note that these upper bounds only make sense if the sessions initiated per entry-guard-interval also use each entry-guard at least once. Dropping this assumption requires a more fine-grained analysis. The problem with entry guards is the following: while the probability for de-anonymization is smaller, u will effectively stay de-anonymized as soon as A manages to find u's entry guards (for as long as these entry guards are used). Also, while the above value attains its minimum for m = 1, choosing a small value for m will realistically also incur loss in performance for the whole system. The exact analysis is unfortunately out-of-scope for our approach, but further elaboration on the parameters and their influence on anonymity and performance using simulation can be found in Elahi et al. [EBA + 12].
Link-Corruption
So far we have only been concerned with an adversary A that compromises nodes in the onion routing network in order to learn about the transmitted messages. But our model also supports an adversary that compromises links between nodes and learns about messages transmitted through these links. Thus, the event D αSA alone is not enough to capture all bad events. For sender anonymity, we also lose if the adversary manages to compromise the link between the user and the entry node of the circuit used to transmit the challenge row. Let L αSA be the event that this entry link is compromised and let q be the number of compromised links. Naturally, it is in the best interest of the adversary to not compromise links between user/server and already compromised nodes, as he will not learn anything new that way. Hence we have that
In order to extend our δ by the event L αSA , we can now consider the "bad event" B αSA depending on D αSA :
For more than one challenge row this can be extended in a similar way as before, by just adjusting the event for successful link corruption. Let L * αSA be the event that in one of the challenge rows, an entry-link was successfully compromised. Doing a similar analysis as for the node corruption, we get the following upper bound, which is tight if the user for all challenge rows is the same.
The full derivation of Inequality 1 can be found in Appendix J.3. This concludes the formal analysis of the Tor network with the AnoA framework. We illustrated how AnoA can be used by using it on F or . We showed that F or is (0, δ)-α-IND-CDP for the different anonymity notion we defined in Section 3 and also explored further aspects of OR anonymity accessible through the AnoA framework. Still, we barely scratched the surface with our analysis and see many different directions for future work in the Tor analysis with AnoA. We further elaborate on these directions in Section 8.
Note that, although we only considered the ideal functionality F or in our analysis, Theorem 17 allows us to lift our results to any (cryptographic) protocol that realizes F or .
Related Work
Pfitzmann and Hansen [PH10] develop a consistent terminology for various relevant anonymity notions; however, their definitions lack formalism. Nevertheless, these informal definitions form the basis of almost all recent anonymity analysis, and we also adopt their terminology and definitions in our AnoA framework.
Our relaxation of differential privacy is not the first variation of differential privacy. Gehrke et al. recently introduced the stronger notion of zero-knowledge privacy [GLP11] and the relaxed notion of crowd-blending privacy [GHLP12] . Similar to differential privacy, these notions are not well suited for the analysis of AC protocols. However, extending the crowd-blending privacy notion with corruptible distributed mechanisms and flexible adjacency functions would allow capturing the notion of k-anonymity for AC protocols. We could imagine applying the resulting concept to Mixnets, in which each mix waits for a certain amount of time: if at least k messages arrived, these messages are then processed, otherwise they are discarded; however, discarding messages in such a way may not be acceptable in a real world application.
Efforts to formally analyze anonymity properties have already been made using communicating sequential processes (CSP) [SS96] , epistemic logic [SS99, HO05], Kripke structures [HS04] , and probabilistic automata [APSVR11] . However, these formalisms have only being applied to simple protocols such DC-net. Since it's not clear if these frameworks can capture an adversary with auxiliary information, it seems difficult to model complex protocols such as onion routing and its traffic analysis attacks. It still presents an interesting challenge to relate the probabilistic notions among those mentioned above (e.g. [ [FJS12] among these by Feigenbaum, Johnson and Syverson models the OR protocol in a simplified black-box abstraction, and studies a notion of relationship anonymity notion which is slightly different from ours: here the adversary wishes to identify the destination of a user's message. As we discussed in Section 4.3, this relationship anonymity notion is slightly weaker than ours. Moreover, their model is not flexible enough to extend to other system-level scenarios such fingerprinting attacks [PNZE11, CZJJ12, DCRS12].
Hevia and Micciancio [HM08] introduce an indistinguishability based framework for the analysis of AC protocols. While they take a similar approach as in AnoA, there are some notable differences: The first difference is that their anonymity definition does not consider compromised parties; as a consequence, they only define qualitative anonymity guarantees. While the authors discuss corruption as a possible extension, for most real world AC protocols they would have to adjust their notion to a quantitative anonymity notion as in AnoA. The second difference is the strength of the adversary: we consider a stronger adversary which determine the order in which messages are sent through the network, whereas Hevia and Micciancio only allow the attacker to specify which party sends which messages to whom.
Conclusion and Future Directions
In this paper we have presented our generic framework AnoA. We have defined new, strong variants of anonymity properties like sender anonymity, sender unlinkability and relationship anonymity based on a novel relaxation of computational differential privacy, and presented how to concisely formulate them in AnoA. We have shown that our definitions of the anonymity guarantees accurately model prominent notions in the literature. We have also applied AnoA to the UC framework and shown that the results shown for ideal functionalities carry over to their secure cryptographic protocols.
Additionally, we have conducted an extensive analysis of the Tor network. We have validated the inherent imperfection of the current Tor standard in the presence of a significant fraction of compromised nodes, and we have given quantitative measures of the different forms of anonymity against passive adversaries that statically corrupt nodes. Naturally, the next step will be to investigate adaptively corrupting adversaries and active attacks on Tor such as selective DoS attacks [BDMT07] . We also plan to analyze the influence of Tor's node selection policies [DM09] and of a priori probability distributions over the users [FJS12] on Tor's anonymity properties. Moreover, we will apply AnoA to other AC protocols such as Mixnets [Cha81] and the DISSENT system [CGF10] .
On the framework level we will investigate other anonymity notions such as unobservability and undetectability [PH10] , and their relation to the notions we already defined in this paper.
H Framework
In this section we provide the proofs for the claims made in section 4.
H.1 Expressivity
We first recall the definition of δ-sender anonymity derived from the literature.
Definition 7 [sender anonymity]A protocol P with user space U of size N has δ-sender anonymity if for all ppt-adversaries A P r u
where the challenger SACh is as defined in Figure 5 .
Our definition with the adjacency function α SA implies definition 7.
Lemma 8 [sender anonymity] For all protocols P over a (finite) user space U of size N it holds that if P has (0, δ)-α-IND-CDP for α SA , P also has δ-sender anonymity as in Definition 7.
Proof. We proof this by contradiction: given an adversary A * that breaks δ-sender anonymity, we construct an adversary A that breaks (0, δ) − α-IND-CDP for α SA . Let A * be a ppt-adversary that wins against Ch b (P, α SA ) with probability more than 
Halt. Note that independent of the bit of our challenger Ch b , we simulate a perfect challenger SACh for sender anonymity. The choice for u 1 is completely ignored by Ch 0 and the choice for u 0 is ignored by Ch 1 as the adjacency function α SA for sender anonymity does not modify its inputs.
We calculate the success probability for our adversary A. Since the probability of success is independent of the bit b, we will show the calculation parametric in b. For readability we will use the following notation:
Ch b (P,αSA) the adversary A with oracle access to Ch b (P, α SA ) that chooses the value u b R ←U respectively.
• A * u b := A * Ab(ub) , The adversary A * that has oracle access to the simulated challenger ←U is chosen by A.
Equation (1) holds true since:
• If A * guesses the correct u * = u b , A will always output the correct b.
• If A * guesses a wrong u * , A will output the correct b only if the coin toss c R ←{0, 1} matched b (which happens with probability 1 2 ) and if additionally A * did not guess u * = u 1−b by chance (which happens with probability N −2 N −1 independently of the behavior of A * , since u 1−b is drawn uniformly at random, but is discarded by Ch b (P, α SA ) and thus never actually used).
For equation (2) we make use of our assumption that A * indeed wins against an honest challenger SACh u (P) with probability more than 1 N + δ. Finally we can compute the difference:
Thus, A is a ppt-adversary that breaks (0, δ)-α-IND-CDP for α SA for P.
The otehr direction also holds, i.e. sender anonymity implies α-IND-CDP for α SA , but only with a changed parameter
Lemma 9 For all protocols P over a (finite) userspace U of size N it holds that if P has δ N -sender anonymity as in Definition 7 P also has (0, δ)-α-IND-CDP for α SA . Halt. If by chance one of the users u 0 , u 1 has been picked by SACh, A * has an advantage. Otherwise, u b * will hit the correct uniformly drawn user with probability 1 N −2 . We now compute the success probability of A. For readability we use the following notation:
Proof. Given an adversary
The adversary A that has oracle access to the challenger SACh u b (P) where u b R ←U is chosen by this challenger.
• A * b (u b ) := A * Ch b (P,αSA) the adversary A * with oracle access to the simulated challenger
We recall the definition of δ-sender unlinkability Definition 10 [δ-sender unlinkability] A protocol P with user space U has δ-sender unlinkability if for all ppt-adversaries A P r b = 0 : b←A ULCh0(P) − P r b = 0 : b←A
Lemma 11 [sender unlinkability] For all protocols P over a user space U it holds that if P has (0, δ)-α-IND-CDP for α UL , P also has δ-sender unlinkability as in Definition 10.
Proof. We proof the lemma by contradiction. Given an adversary A * that breaks δ-unlinkability, we will construct an adversary A that breaks (0, δ) − α-IND-CDP for α UL . Let A * be a ppt-adversary that wins against ULCh with probability more than δ. We define A as follows: Halt. The adjacency function α UL changes the data sets such that D 0 contains only one of the users u 0 , u 1 , while in D 1 both will be present. Together with the challenger Ch b (P, α UL ) we simulate a challenger ULCh perfectly.
Whenever b * is the correct answer for the (simulated) challenger ULCh, it also is the correct answer for Ch b (P, α UL ).
Since by assumption A * breaks δ-sender unlinkability with probability more than δ, A breaks (0, δ)-α-IND-CDP.
Lemma 12 For all protocols P over user space U of size N it holds that if P has 1 N (N −1) δ-sender unlinkability as in Definition 10, P also has (0, δ)-α-IND-CDP for α UL .
Proof. Assume P provides 
For readability we use following place holders for the different events
With this we get by suitably adding 0 several times
Here we make following assumptions
As A * is an adversary especially constructed for Ch b (α UL ) we can assume that he also works better against this adversary. Otherwise we can construct an even better adversary A * which makes the same decisions as A * with oracle ULCh b and use him instead of A * .
•
, as otherwise A * already is an adversary which breaks δ-unlinkability, which is a contradiction.
Together with our initial assumption, that
H.2 Relations among the various notions
In this section we explore the relations among our notions of sender anonymity, sender unlinkability and relationship anonymity.
Below follow the lemmas and their proofs for the various relations between the anonymity notions, as visualized in Fig. 7 . The adversary A perfectly simulates a challenger against relationship anonymity. However, since he chooses R c to be the same before sending the input tables to its oracle, it also fits the requirements for sender anonymity. Whenever A * wins the relationship anonymity game, A wins the sender anonymity game. The adversary A perfectly simulates a challenger against sender unlinkability (α SA does not change the input tables). However, since exactly one challenge row exists in (D 0 , D 1 ) it also fits the requirements for sender anonymity. Whenever A * wins the relationship anonymity game, A wins the sender anonymity game.
Lemma 15 [Sender unlinkability does not imply sender anonymity] If a protocol P has (0, δ)-α-IND-CDP for α UL , P does not necessarily have (0, δ )-α-IND-CDP for α SA for any δ < 1.
Proof. Consider the following counterexample protocol P. It processes the input table row by row, perfectly hiding all information about the user and broadcasting the message. At any point, an adversary might ask it to reveal the user of a given message, but only once. Obviously this protocol does not have sender anonymity, as the adversary can deanonymize any user. For unlinkability, however, deanonymizing the user of one single message does not suffice. Proof. Consider the following counterexample protocol P. It processes the input table row by row, perfectly hiding all information about the message and possible recipients, but leaking the users that send messages. An adversary can easily distinguish input tables, where e.g. a user only is present in D 1 but not in D 0 , but for breaking relationship anonymity, information about the messages and/or recipients has to be present.
H.3 Leveraging UC
In this section we derive the proof for Lemma 17. We first give the required definitions from the UC-framework and then give the proof.
Definition 20 (Indistinguishability [Can01] ). Two binary distribution ensembles X and Y are indistinguishable, denoted X ≈ Y , if for every c ∈ N there is a η 0 ∈ N such that for all η > η 0 and all x we have that
The real world. For the process in the real world we introduce the random variable Real Π,A,D (η, x) which captures the interaction of a protocol Π with an adversary A, observed by a distinguisher D.Real Π,A,D will denote the ensemble of all those distributions. Note that as we try to argue about α-IND-CDP, our input x will be a tuple of input tables (D 0 , D 1 ).
The ideal world. Similarly, we introduce the random variable Ideal F ,S,D (η, x) which captures the interaction of an ideal functionality F, a simulator S and the distinguisher. Ideal F ,S,D will again denote the ensemble of such random variables.
Definition 21 (Realization in UC)
. A protocol Π UC-realizes an ideal functionality F if for every PPT adversary A of Π there exists a PPT simulator S such that for every PPT distinguisher D it holds that
In order to stay consistent with the notation used in the main body of the paper, but still catch all technical details of UC, we adopt following notation: The adversary we used in AnoA in order to define α-IND-CDP is now part of the environment Env. We capture the interaction of adversary -as denoted above, and protocol by taking both as arguments into the challenger Ch, i.e. we write Ch b (Π, A, α) instead of just Ch b (Π, α).
Given the realization of a ( , δ)-differentially-private ideal functionality by a protocol Π, we get differential privacy for Π. 
Using the ( , δ)-differential privacy of F, the second expression can be bound as follows
Putting Equations 2 and 3 together, we get
By assumption, Π UC-realizes F.
] is negligible. As δ is not negligible, the difference 4 stays non-negligible, and positive. Hence we get that
for some non negligible value δ , contradicting the UC-realization of F by Π (Def. 21). Therefore our initial assumption is wrong and Π is ( , ∆)-α-IND-CDP.
I Abstracting Tor in UC
We cite the the description of the ideal functionality F or . Sections I.1 and I.2 are taken from [BGKM12] , and in section I.3 we give an extension of the model in order to handle traffic analysis attacks.
I.1 System and Adversary Model
We consider a fully connected network of n + m parties N = {P 1 , . . . , P n , . . . , P n+1 , . . . , P n+m }. We consider the parties P 1 , . . . , P n to be OR nodes, and the parties P n+1 , . . . , P n+m to only be users. We furthermore assume that the set of OR nodes is publicly known. The onion routers can be compromised by the attacker by sending compromise messages. The users, however, can in our model not be compromised, since the attacker can just act as a user of the OR network. Formally, P n+1 , . . . , P n+m , consequently, do not react towards compromise messages.
Tor has not been designed to resist against global attackers. Such an attacker is too strong for many practical purposes as it can simply break the anonymity of an OR protocol by holding back all but one onion and tracing that one onion though the network. However, in contrast to previous work, we do not only consider local attackers, which do not control more than the compromised OR routers, but also partially global attackers that control a certain portion of the network. Analogous to the network functionality F syn proposed by Canetti [Can01] , we model the network as an ideal functionality F net , which bounds the number of attacker-controlled links to q ∈ [0, n 2 ]. For attacker-controlled links the messages are forwarded to the attacker; otherwise, they are directly delivered.
Let S represent all possible destination servers {S 1 , . . . , S ∆ } which reside in the network abstracted by a network functionality F net q .
We stress that the UC framework does not provide a notion of time; hence, the analysis of timing attacks, such as traffic analysis, is not in the scope of this work.
Adaptive Corruptions. Forward secrecy [DvOW92] is an important property for onion routing. In order to analyze this property, we allow adaptive corruptions of nodes by the attacker A. Such an adaptive corruption is formalized by a message compromise, which is sent to the respective party. Upon such a compromise message the internal state of that party is deleted and a long-term secret key sk for the node is revealed to the attacker. A can then impersonate the node in the future; however, A cannot obtain the information about its ongoing sessions. We note that this restriction arises due to the currently available security proof techniques and the well-known selective opening problem with symmetric encryptions [Hof11] , and the restriction is not specific to our constructions [BMP00, GL01] . We could also restrict ourselves to a static adversary as in previous work [CL05] ; however, that would make an analysis of forward secrecy impossible.
I.2 Ideal functionality
The presentation of the ideal functionality F or is along the lines of the description OR protocol Π or from Section [BGKM12, Section 2.4]. We continue to use the message-based state transitions from Π or , and consider sub-machines for all n nodes in the ideal functionality. To communicate with each other through messages and data structures, these sub-machines share a memory space in the functionality. The sub-machine pseudocode for the ideal functionality appears in Figure 11 and three subroutines are defined in Figure 12 . As the similarity between pseudocodes for the OR protocol and the ideal functionality is obvious, rather than explaining the OR message flows again, we concentrate on the differences. The only major difference between Π or and F or is that cryptographic primitives such as message wrapping, unwrapping, and key exchange are absent in the ideal world; we do not have any keys in F or , and the OR messages WrOn and UnwrOn as well as the 1W-AKE messages Initiate, Respond , and ComputeKey are absent.
The ideal functionality also abstracts the directory server and expects on the input/output interface of F N reg (from the setting with Π or ) an initial message with the list P i n i=1 of valid nodes. This initial message corresponds to the list of onion routers that have been approved by an administrator. We call the part of F or that abstracts the directory servers dir. For the sake of brevity, we do not present the pseudocode of dir. Upon an initial message with a list P i n i=1 of valid nodes, dir waits for all nodes P i (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) for a message (register, P i ). Once all nodes registered, dir sends a message (registered, P i n i=1 ) with a list of valid and registered nodes to every party that registered, and to every party that sends a retrieve message to dir.
Messages from A and F net . In Figure 11 and Figure 13 , we present the pseudocode for the attacker messages and the network functionality, respectively. For our basic analysis, we model an adversary that can control all communication links and servers in F net , but cannot view or modify messages between parties due to the presence of the secure and authenticated channel. Therefore, sub-machines in the functionality store their messages in the shared memory, and create and send handles P, P next , h for these messages in F net . The message length does not need to be leaked as we assume a fixed message size (for all M (κ)). Here, P is the sender, P next is the receiver and h is a handle or a pointer to the message in the shared memory of the ideal functionality. In our analysis, all F net messages flow to A, which may choose to return these handles back to F or through F net at its own discretion. However, F net also maintains a mechanism through observedLink flags for the non-global adversary A. The adversary may also corrupt or replay the corresponding messages; however, these active attacks are always detected by the receiver due to the presence of a secure and authenticated channel between any two communicating parties and we need not model these corruptions.
The adversary can compromise a party P or server S by sending a compromise message to respectively F or and F net . For party P or server S, the respective functionality then sets the compromised tag to true. Furthermore, all input or network messages that are supposed to be visible to the compromised entity are forwarded to the adversary. In principle, the adversary runs that entity for the rest of the protocol and can send messages from that entity. In that case, it can also propagate corrupted messages which in Π or can only be detected during UnwrOn calls at OP or the exit node. We model these corruptions using corrupted (msg) = {true, false} status flags, where corrupted (msg) status of messages is maintained across nodes until they reach end nodes. Furthermore, for every corrupted message, the adversary also provides a modification function T (·) as the end nodes run by the adversary may continue execution even after observing a corrupted flag. In that case, T (·) captures the exact modificaiton made by the adversary.
We stress that F or does not need to reflect reroutings and circuit establishments initiated by the attacker, because the attacker learns, loosely speaking, no new information by rerouting onions.
5 Similar to the previous work [CL05] , a message is directly given to the adversary if all remaining nodes in a communication path are under adversary control.
I.3 Explicit traffic analysis
The UC framework does not allow the attacker to measure time. A machine is still until it is activated again, and upon an activation a machine does not know how much time evolved. Against Tor, however, traffic analysis attacks (requiring the attacker to measure the distance between messages) are well known . Naturally, our analysis does not cover all these attacks. In the same way as Syverson and Johnson , we model a variety of these timing vulnerabilities by the user and the server for an onion circuit if first and last node of the circuit is compromised.
We defined a modified ideal functionality F or by adding a data structure circuits, which assigns to every circuit id cid the full circuit P cid1 ⇐⇒ P 1 ⇐⇒ · · · P = circuits(cid ) to which this cid belongs. Moreover, upon a data cell at an exit node, F or calls a subroutine SendMessage (cid , P, S, sid , m ), where cid is the circuit id with the previous node in the circuit. SendMessage leaks the user and sender is leaked if the first node P 1 and last node P in the circuit is compromised.
It does, however, not suffice to only check whether the first and the last node is compromised, we also have to check whether the link from the user to the the first node and from the exit node to the exit node is compromised. Technically, however, the information whether these links are compromised resides in F net q and not in F or . Therefore, we consider F or to comprise F net q as a submachine and do not consider F net q as a separate entity anymore. This is a mere technicality since in the work of Backes, Goldberg, Kate, and Mohammadi F net q only was a separate entity to present a unifying treatment of partially global attackers in UC. As part of F or , it is possible to let the subroutine SendMessage check which links are compromised.
The subroutine SendMessage is depicted in Figure 14 . For the backward messages, F or analogously leaks the server. Since a circuit can be used to communicate to several servers (even at the same time), F or have to track the single onions in order to be able to determine the server from which each onion came. We introduce a data structure origin(h) that tracks for each handle the party O = origin(h) it was sent from. This origin O is additionally passed to the subroutine SendMessage. We accordingly modify SendMessage to check whether P next is an onion proxy, i.e., a user, and whether the entry node (or the link from the user to the entry node) and the exit node (or the link from the exit node to the server) is compromised. In that case additionally, the server is leaked.
F or leaks strictly more information than F or ; consequently, F or trivially UC realizes F or .
Lemma 22 (F or UC realizes F or ). F or UC realizes F or .
Proof. The simulator merely redirects all messages from the environment to the attacker and F or . Only if a message (P, P , S, sid , m) is sent (by an exit node) by F or , the simulator sends (P , S, sid , m) to the attacker. Moreover, since the environment expects an ideal functionality F net q , the simulator implements a redirection for F net q . In other words, all messages that are sent to F net q are sent to F or marked as a message for the submachine F net q ; analogously, all messages from F or that are sent from the submachine F net q are sent from the simulated F net q . There is another technicality. F or sends along with every handle a value server , which either contains the identity of the server or the symbol −. The simulator removes this entry from every leakage, i.e., from every tuple that contains a handle. This simulator produces a perfectly indistinguishable view from the interaction of the attacker with F or .
J Tor
In this section we show the proofs for the claims from the Tor-Analysis section 6.
J.1 Formal Analysis
We prove that F or is (0, δ)-α-IND-CDP. For this, we first prove Lemma 18, which we then use in order to proof Theorem 19. Proof. We fix the random string r Ch . This in turn fixes the circuits drawn by F or for each row.
Lemma 18
As circuits are drawn independently from the messages transmitted, F or draws the same set of circuits to transmit either input table. Considering any message m the adversary A intercepts, all he can learn from it is a) which party in F or the message m comes from, b) where m is supposed to be send, c) which circuit was used by the curcuit-ID (cid).
Note that in the ideal functionality, no actual message contents are sent through the network, as message passing is realized via handles. Furthermore, we assume ¬D α . For α ∈ {α SA , α UL } A cannot learn anything about the sender directly. Let R ⊆ {0, 1} p(η) be the subset of all random strings r A , for which A Ch0(For,α,rCh) (r A ) = 0. As A Ch b (For,α,rCh) (r A ) is a deterministic machine, also A Ch1(For,α,rCh) (r A ) = 0 exactly for every r A ∈ R, as both Ch 0 and Ch 1 forward the same messages to A.
If α = α Rel , A might learn partial information by compromising either entry-or exit-node. But this only allows him to reduce the set of possible input tables to two, each of which could have been selected by only one of the challengers. By the same argument as above, if we fix r A , A returns the same value, regardless of which challenger he interacts with.
Hence A does not learn about the challenger's decision on one of the input tables, and we get for any random string r Ch 
As the probabilities are the same for any random string r Ch , we then get Using Lemma 18, we now prove the main theorem.
The probability P r[L * ] is maximal if the i j are maximal. This happens when the users for all challenge rows are the same and the adversary can invest all link corruptions for this single user. We then get
upon an input (setup): draw a fresh handle h; a set registered flag ← true store lookup(h) ← (dir, registered, N ) send (h, register, P ) to A wait for a msg (dir, registered, N ) via a handle output (ready, (Pj) n j=1 ) = (ready, N ) upon an input (createcircuit, P = P, P1, . . . , P ):
store P and C ← P ; ExtendCircuit(P, C)
upon an input (send, C = P cid 1 ⇐⇒ P1 ⇐⇒ · · · P , m): if Used (cid 1) < ttlC then Used (cid 1)++; SendMessage(P1, cid 1, relay, data, m ) else DestroyCircuit(C, cid 1); output (destroyed, C, m) upon receiving a handle P, Pnext , h from Fnet : send (msg) ← lookup(h) to a receiving submachine Pnext upon receiving a msg (Pi, cid , create) through a handle: store C ← Pi cid ⇐⇒ P ; SendMessage(Pi, cid , created) upon receiving a msg (Pi, cid , created) through a handle:
if prev (cid ) = (P , cid ) then SendMessage(P , cid , relay, extended) else if prev (cid ) = ⊥ then ExtendCircuit(P, C) upon receiving a msg (Pi, cid , relay, O) through a handle:
if update C with Pex; ExtendCircuit(P, C) case data:
if (P = OP) then output (received, C, m) else if m = (S, m ) generate or lookup the unique sid for cid send (P, S, sid , m ) to Fnetq case corrupted : /*corrupted onion*/ DestroyCircuit(C, cid ) case default: /*encrypted forward/backward onion*/ SendMessage(P , cid , relay, O) upon receiving a msg (sid , m) from Fnet : obtain C = P cid ⇐⇒ P for sid SendMessage(P , cid , relay, data, m ) upon receiving a msg (Pi, cid , destroy) through a handle:
DestroyCircuit(C, cid ) upon receiving a msg (Pi, P, h, [corrupt, T (·)])from A:
(message) ← lookup(h) if corrupt = true then message ← T (msg); set corrupted (message) ← true process message as if the receiving submachine was P upon receiving a msg (compromise, P ) from A:
set compromised (P ) ← true delete all local information at P ⇐⇒ P1 ⇐⇒ · · · P ): determine the next node P +1 from P and C if P +1 = ⊥ then output (created, C) else if P +1 = P1 then cid 1←{0, 1} κ ; SendMessage(P1, cid 1, create) else SendMessage(P1, cid 1, relay, {extend, P +1 }) upon receiving a msg (obverse, P, Pnext ) from A: set observedLink (P, Pnext ) ← true upon receiving a msg (compromise, S) from A: set compromised (S) ← true; send A all existing sid upon receiving a msg (P, Pnext /S, m) from For:
if Pnext /S is a For node then if observedLink (P, Pnext ) = true then forward the msg (P, Pnext , m) to A else reflect the msg (P, Pnext , m) to For else if Pnext /S is a Fnet server then if compromised (S) = true then forward the msg (P, S, m) to A else output (P, S, m) upon receiving a msg (P/S, Pnext , m) from A:
forward the msg (P/S, Pnext , m) to For SendMessage (cid , P , S, sid , m):
⇐⇒ P1 ⇐⇒ · · · P = circuits(cid ) if (compromised (P1) or observedLink (P, P1)) and (compromised (P ) or observedLink (P , S)) then send (P, P , S, sid , m) to Fnetq else send (P , S, sid , m) to Fnetq ⇐⇒ P1 ⇐⇒ · · · P = circuits(cid next ) if (compromised (P1) or observedLink (P, P1)) and (compromised (P ) or observedLink (P , O)) then set server := O else server := − if compromised (Pnext ) = true then let P last be the last node in the continguous compromised path starting in Pnext if (P last = OP ) or P last is the exit node then send the entire msg to A else send P, Pnext , . . . , P last , server , cid next , cmd, h to A else send P, Pnext , server , h to Fnetq 
